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Abstract
This paper aims to explore the mechanical effect of a company’s share repurchase on
earnings per share (EPS). In particular, while a share repurchase scheme will reduce the
overall number of shares, suggesting that the EPS may increase, clearly the expenditure
will reduce the net earnings of a company, introducing a trade-off between these competing
effects. We first of all review accretive share repurchases, then characterise the increase in
EPS as a function of price paid by the company. Subsequently, we analyse and quantify the
estimated difference in earnings growth between a company’s natural growth in the absence
of buyback scheme to that with its earnings altered as a result of the buybacks. We conclude
with an examination of the effect of share repurchases in two cases studies in the US stock-
market. Accompanying code can be found at https://github.com/particlemontecarlo/
quantifying_eps_buybacks.
1 Introduction
1.1 Share repurchases background
Share repurchases provide a popular means for companies to return cash to their shareholders
as an alternative to stock dividends [12, 13]. Popularised in the 80s, following a change in
regulations governing open market share repurchase schemes, they became a means for managers
to alter earnings per share via financial engineering [7, 4] thereby having a knock-on effect on
the share price. Since, repurchase programs have generally increased in US stocks [6], with the
value of buybacks of S&P 500 companies representing a significant portion of US gross domestic
private investment. In general, the precise reasons for a company to buybacks its shares may
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vary [2], however efforts have shown that companies may use them as an earnings management
device, with evidence to suggest the intention of aiming to inflate the earnings per share [11].
Indeed, while share repurchases inevitably reduce the number of shares outstanding (thereby
reducing the divisor of the earnings per share), such an action will inevitably shrink a company’s
asset base thereby potentially having a negative effect on the earnings per share [1].
From an investment perspective, on the one hand it may provide a positive sign that a company’s
board believes in the future growth in the company - enough to treat the repurchase as an
investment decision – on the other hand such a decision may also reflect that the company has
limited investment opportunity (as well as the aforementioned motivation to inflate earnings)
[8].
1.2 Share repurchases in the media
Recently, buybacks have made headlines due to a ‘record year’ in buybacks [10] and the recent
activity following the very high level of cash reserves held by a number of companies, particularly
in the technology sector, [16, 17] (curtailing only recently [9]), with similar activity observed
in the aerospace industry [3]. A recent surge in US repurchases has been observed in part due
to Trump’s tax reform thereby freeing up capital [15]. The FT article ‘Negative interest rates
fuel record Japan share buybacks’ (May 24, 2016) remarks the increase buybacks as a result of
negative interest rates in Japan. However, the surge in buyback activity has seen criticism in
[5] as newly available cash reserves are spent on repurchases benefitting investors rather than
boosting employment or R&D. Additionally, a correlation in [14] has been observed between the
increase in sell-offs of single stocks and an increase in purchasing ETFs related to buybacks.
Figure 1.1 compares the amount spent on buybacks by the S&P 500 with a measure of interest
in buybacks determined through Google trends - a measure of the number of Google searches
worldwide.1 We see that there is a reasonable degree of correlation between the two; furthermore,
there is a peak in search activity in mid 2018.
1.3 Quantifying share repurchases
The following work aims to quantify explicitly how share repurchases can be used to mechanically
inflate (or deflate) a company’s earnings per share. A method is developed through an argument
based on cash flow analysis to examine how the buyback affects this, isolating a few unitless
quantities relating to both the current prevailing state of the wider economy and a company’s
characteristics, all of which can be obtained publicly, to quantify this effect. We primarily
treat the earnings as growing geometrically, though provide an alternative analysis when the
1Google trends interest data for the search term ‘share buyback’ was used from 2004-2019.
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Figure 1.1: Comparison of value of buybacks spent on S&P 500 since 2004 and interest measured
by Google searches
earnings are treated as growing arithmetically (providing a more rigorous quantification of the
uncertainty) in the Appendix.
In addition we are able to explore the sensitivity of the growth in earnings to the changes in the
salient variables. Finally, we are able use this analysis to estimate a company’s natural growth
rate without this artificial inflation of the earnings. In particular, we focus on the US market,
examining the S&P 500 and Apple as an individual stock as case studies.
2 Accretive share repurchases
We consider the effect on earnings as a consequence of share repurchases at different prices. With
similar expressions remarked in the literature [11, 1], the following shows that the repurchase
is accretive (increases the earnings per share) only if the price-earnings ratio, denoted PE , of
the traded company is less than a certain value dependent on the interest and tax rate (i and
tTax respectively). Or, put another way, if the earnings yield (the reciprocal of the P/E ratio)
is greater than the after tax interest rate earned on the company’s cash.
We have that the earning per share (for N shares issued) for a company can be expressed as
follows
E := Earnings per share
=
(O + Ci)(1− tTax)−mmin
N
where O, C, and mmin denote the trading profit, cash reserves and minority charge respectively.
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If the company spends S to repurchase its shares at a price P , then with a dividend of d the
earnings per share after the repurchase, E′, will be adjusted as follows
E′ =
(O +
(
C − S (1 + dP )) i)(1− tTax)−mmin
N − SP
For the purposes of the following we assume that both the contribution from dividends is neg-
ligible, i.e d  P , and that the minority charge negligible, i.e. mmin ≈ 0. Finally, we let
α = 1− tTax denote the fraction of assets retained after tax. As a result, for a repurchase to be
accretive we require that E′ ≥ E and so
(O + (C − S) i)αN ≥ (O + Ci)α
(
N − S
P
)
(O + Ci)α
S
P
≥ SiαN
Which after rearrangement suggests that
(O + Ci)α
N
/P ≥ iα =⇒ PE = P
E
≤ 1
iα
i.e. the price-earnings ratio is less than 1iα . We will, therefore, in the following refer to P
∗
E :=
1
αi
as the ‘critical P-E ratio’ and P ∗ := Eαi as the ‘critical price’ given a company’s earnings per
share E. To ensure proper units, we note that the period over which a company’s earnings per
share is stated must correspond to the period over which interest i is paid. Unless otherwise
stated, we assume that both time periods are annualised. Nominal values for the critical PE
ratio are shown as a function of the interest rate i ∈ [1%, 10%] in Figure 3.1a and for value
of tax rate between 10% and 50%. We see that for interest rates between 2-3% with tax rates
between 10-50% then the critical P/E is around 50.
Note that the long-term decline in interest rates over the last four decades has had the effect
of increasing the the critical P-E ratio from approximately 15 in the late 1980’s to the current
level of roughly 50 in the late 2010s. A corollary of this effect as we shall come on to quantify is
that the boost to earnings per share for a given proportion of shares repurchased has increased
significantly over the same period.
3 Earnings enhancement under buybacks
We are interested in how the earnings per share after a buyback (or sequence of buybacks) given
the expenditure at time differs from that without a buyback. In the following we will consider
under a geometric model for earnings growth what the natural earnings would look like given
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knowledge of the size of the buyback and quantities reflecting the state of the economy. For an
interest rate of i which we assume is approximately constant, we define a company’s earnings
at time t as
Et = α
Ot + Cti
Nt
where Ot is operating earnings and Ct is the net interest earning assets α = 1− tTax which we
assume is approximately constant. Additionally, we assume that Ot is the same in both the
presence and absence of a buyback. We model the interest earning assets as
CT = CtIt,T
where It,T is a continuously compounded interest rate process, for example, It,T = (1 + ı)T−t
for some constant ı ≥ 0. Throughout, T will be used to refer to a terminal index and t an initial
point in time (sometimes 0).
We let γt := StPtNt denote the fraction paid of the market capitalisation in the buyback at time
t and mt := PtP∗t as the definition of the share price as a fraction of the critical price.
Proposition 1. The difference in earnings at time T , E′T , relative to that without a buyback
ET can be expressed as
E′T =
ET −mtγtIt,TEt
1− γt (3.1)
and we have the following approximation for the difference in earnings with and without buybacks
as
E′T = ET + (ET −mtIt,TEt)
∞∑
n=1
γnt
= ET + (ET −mtIt,TEt) γt +O(γ2t )
Proof in Appendix.
We consider a simple example when the buyback is accretive so that mt ∈ [0, 1]. and, addition-
ally, under a simple growth strategy where earnings at time t are simply invested in a risk-free
investment we have that ET = It,TEt. In this case we have that
E′T − ET
ET
≥ (1−mt) γt
So we see that we may increase the earnings at a future time T in the presence of a buyback
at time t by an amount at least proportional to that spent on the buyback scheme γt. Such a
relation provides a significant incentive for managers with pay related to earnings performance
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to increase the earnings per share through buying back shares, up to the extent that they are
accretive. We explore this in more detail in the following.
3.1 Instantaneous enhancement under buybacks
We are able to consider the instantaneous change in earnings growth as a result of the buyback
through setting T = t. As a result we see that by Proposition 1, that the earnings per share
post-buyback can be expressed succinctly as
E′ =
1−mγ
1− γ E
dependency of m = PP∗ and γ on t is suppressed for notational convenience and we set It,t = 1.
Similarly, we have that the relative change is then
∆E :=
E′ − E
E
=
γ
1− γ (1−m) (3.2)
We see as expected, for zero expenditure (γ = 0) then the change in earnings is 0. Furthermore,
performing a series expansion of ∆E around γ = 0, i.e. suggesting relative to the market
capitalisation the amount spent on the repurchase by the company is small we have that up to
an o((mγ)2) term that
∆E ≈
(
1
m
− 1
)
mγ =
S
P ∗N
(
1
m
− 1
)
(3.3)
In particular, if we further assume that the buyback is accretive, i.e. PE ≤ P ∗E , then we have
that both m, γ ∈ [0, 1] and that the remainders in the series expansion are positive, suggesting
that in fact ∆E ≥ SP∗N
(
1
m − 1
)
so that the approximation is conservative in this sense. This
linearisation shows how the relative change in earnings is affected as a function of the proportion
spent on the critical price. The gains (or losses) of earnings as a result of the buyback under this
normalisation are plotted in Figure 3.1 as a function of the price paid for the shares for both
the exact expression 3.2 and the first order approximation 3.3. As can be seen, the linearisation
is considerably accurate for SP∗N ≈ 1% and for a large range of m. We also see that the
improvement to earnings rises quite steeply as m approaches 0, demonstrative of the highly
nonlinear relationship between the two.
3.2 Earnings enhancement under geometric growth in earnings
We are now interested in the value of earnings at some future time T given a buyback for γt
at time t < T . In the following, we let Et denote the natural earnings under the absence of a
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Figure 3.1: Critical price and EPS enhancement
buyback scheme and define the normalised natural earnings xˆ from time t ≥ 0 to T ≥ t implicitly
as satisfying
ET = xˆt,TEt
In this case we have that from Proposition 1 that
E′T =
ET −mtγtIt,TEt
1− γt
=
1
1− γt
(
ET − It,T Et
P ∗t
St
Nt
)
=
1
1− γt
(
1− It,T
xˆt,T
St
P ∗t Nt
)
ET
Finally, substituting again γt = StPtNt as the proportion spent on share buybacks relative to the
market capitalisation and substitute Pt = mP ∗t we can express this neatly as
E′T =
1
1− γt
(
1−mγt It,T
xˆt,T
)
ET (3.4)
We consider the special case of t = 0 and simple constant geometric growth models both for
interest rates and growth, i.e. that xˆ0,T = (1+ξ)T and I0,T = (1+ ı)T for two constants ξ, ı ≥ 0.
In this case letting γ denote the normalised value of the buyback at t = 0 then
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E′T =
1
1− γ
(
1−mγ
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)T)
ET
As we can see, if we consider the ‘immediate’ change in EPS by setting T = 0, we recover the
earnings enhancement as detailed above. Such a formula reveals a number of important charac-
teristics of share buybacks. Firstly, to a degree as expected, as the interest rate ı increases the
future enhancement diminishes, suggesting that the company would have been better retaining
the cash rather than repurchasing shares, as measured by the earnings per share. Furthermore,
we see that up to an o(γ2) term then a series expansion of E′T around γ = 0 provides the
approximation
E′T − ET
ET
≈
(
1−m
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)T)
γ. (3.5)
We refer to the boost arising from buybacks to the earnings as ‘the earnings enhancement’.
The series approximation of (3.5) is conservative in that the remainder is positive for γ > 0.
We explore nominal values of γ in the next section. We note that provided ξ > ı the earnings
enhancement converges exponentially towards limT→∞
(
1−m
(
1+ı
1+ξ
)T)
γ = γ through time
suggesting that despite the initial cost in repurchasing the shares, the effect on the earnings can
diminish relatively quickly through time.
We plot the EPS enhancement through time for some representative values of m, x and i. Based
on the current Federal Funds rate of 2% we use this value for i. We then consider x = 0.1 with
m = 0.1, i.e. an annual growth rate of 10% and shares repurchased at 10% of the critical
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price and SP∗N = 2%. As will be seen, such values are representative of the buyback scheme
undertaken by Apple since 2011/2012. For these two values of m we compare E
′
T−E0
E0
with
ET−E0
E0
, plotting the results in 3.2.
3.3 Earnings enhancement under buyback program
We here illustrate that under benign conditions (i.e. accretive buybacks) the growth in earnings
increases geometrically on top of a geometric earnings growth as per the special case considered
previously.
Consider the affect on earnings per share after a series of buybacks occurring at regular intervals.
We have that at time t after a buyback at time 0 that the earnings enhancement above the
natural EPS at time t can be expressed equivalently as
∆Et =
γ
1− γ
(
1−m
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)t)
We consider a buyback program with repurchases occurring at intervals t = cn for n = 1, 2, ..., T
and c > 0. In this case we see that
E′n =
n∏
k=0
(1 + ∆E(c(n− k)))En
=
n∏
k=0
(
1
1− γ
(
1−mγ
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)c(n−k)))
(1 + ξ)cnE0
=
(
(1 + ξ)c
1− γ
)n n∏
k=0
(
1−mγ
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)c(n−k))
E0
=
(
(1 + ξ)c
1− γ
)n n∏
k=0
(
1−mγ
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)ck)
E0 (3.6)
for low interest rates, i.e. ξ ≥ ı we see that as m, γ ∈ [0, 1] then
(
1−mγ
(
1+ı
1+ξ
)ck)
≥(
1−mγ
(
1+ı
1+ξ
)c)
as k ≥ 1. We see that
E′n
E0
≥
(
(1 + ξ)c
1− γ
)n(
1−mγ
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)c)n
≥ (1 + ξ)cn (1 + dγ)n
where the inequality arises from a series approximation up to an o(γ2) term, as before, with
the constant d independent of γ. In periods of low interest rate relative to company growth
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Figure 3.3: Compounded EPS after a sequence of accretive buybacks
the increase in earnings per share resulting from a buyback scheme is at least geometrically
increasing both with the growth of the company ξ and with the proportion spent on buybacks
γ. We examine the behaviour in the limit as n→∞ in which case we see that
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
(
E′n
E0
)
= log
(
(1 + ξ)c
1− γ
)
+ lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=0
log
(
1−mγ
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)ck)
= log
(
(1 + ξ)c
1− γ
)
in contrast, the simple model without buybacks, in which case 1n log
(
En
E0
)
= (1 + ξ)c, and that
asymptotically at least, that the annual growth artificially inflates by approximately (1/(1 −
γ))n ≈ (1 + γ)n purely as a result of buybacks.
Finally we plot how the sequence of buybacks affects the EPS for some toy-values. We consider
firstly m = 0.5, i.e. where the company’s PE ratio shares is 50% of P ∗E the critical value, in
Figure 3.3a. It can be seen after a sequence of buybacks occurring quarterly, we have that the
EPS is between two and three times larger compared to the vanilla growth in EPS, as provided
by En = (1 + ξ)nE0.
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4 Methodology
In the following, we focus on the geometric model for earnings under the effect of a buyback
program on real data, examining primarily to what extent accretive buybacks increase earnings
per share. Of central interest is what are representative values of m and γ in a real setting for
which we appeal to the US stock market. We focus on the situation of a sequence of regular
buybacks, with the normalised growth in earnings given by (3.6)
E′n =
(
(1 + ξ)c
1− γ
)n n∏
k=0
(
1−mγ
(
1 + ı
1 + ξ
)ck)
E0 (4.1)
Estimates of m = PP∗ =
PE
P∗E
rely on values of the critical P ∗E =
1
i(1−tTax) , which in the case of
US stocks we take the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity bond yield and consider both the
prescribed US corporate tax rate and the effective tax rate.
We will use nonlinear least squares to estimate ξ - the natural growth in earnings - from the
data. In a statistical setting, the optimisation can be thought of as fitting normally distributed
observations, with mean given by 4.1 and constant variance. We therefore minimise
(ξ′, E0) := arg min
(ξ,E0)
n′∑
n=0
(Rn − E′n)2
where Rn is the realised earnings and E′n is those under the model in Equation 4.1.
Following methodology similar to [18] we estimate the effective tax rate using the difference
between pre-tax and post-tax profits normalised by the pre-tax profits, with the results shown
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1a shows both the 10Y bond yield and the two tax rates. Excluding the recent tax
reforms we see that the corporate tax has been approximately constant over this period at
approximately 40%, whereas the effective tax rate is significantly lower. Importantly, this has
an effect on the critical P/E in that by definition it is monotonically decreasing in the tax rate.
As such, we plot the critical P/E using both these values in Figure 4.1b where we see that
while there is a discrepancy between the two tax rates, the discrepancy is relatively mild. More
strikingly, from Figure 4.1b we see an overall positive trend in critical P/E over this period,
suggesting that for low-growth companies, in terms of relatively static PE ratios, the result of a
buyback is more likely to be accretive and the earnings per share are more likely to be increased
after a buyback.
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Figure 4.1: Critical P/E, P ∗E , for US market. Interest rate and tax rate data taken from the
Federal Reserve.
4.1 Apple
We focus on Apple during the period of buybacks initiating in 2013, until the present day,
comparing the natural and observed growth rates through the relation of Equation 3.6 after
a sequence of buybacks occurring quarterly at regular intervals. The free parameters in the
model are m = PP∗ , the fraction of the critical price paid, γ =
S
PN the fraction of the market
capitalisation spent on buybacks, and x the expected natural growth rate in EPS. We estimate
both m and γ using the historical data, shown in Figure 4.2, plotting the relevant quantities,
value of the buyback (paid quarterly), with m shown to be in the range 0.2 to 0.4 and γ shown
to vary between 0 and 0.04, with a mean of 0.01. Taking m and γ as the central values of
0.25 and 0.01 respectively we compare the historical growth in earnings (shown in % increase
since the start of the period - 1st January 2012) for a natural growth rate of x = 0.08. The
results are shown in Figure 4.3b, where we see that over this 5-year period the observed growth
in earnings is approximately 188%, however, with a natural estimated growth of only 164%,
suggesting that as much of a quarter of the earnings growth over the period (1− 6488 = 27% 2s.f.)
can be attributable to share repurchases.
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Figure 4.2: Apple data used to estimate m and γ
4.2 S&P 500
We consider the natural growth rate for the S&P 500 based on the values of the critical P/E
ratio identified above from the quarter ending in 31st March 2002 to the quarter ending 29th
March 2018. In this case, we take values for the S&P 500 P/E ratio, estimatingm via m = PP∗ =
PE
P∗E
= PEi(1−ttax) . Figure 4.4a and plots values of m given by taking the ratio of P/E to the critical
P/E, we see that over the financial crisis of 2008/2009 the value for m spikes. This is to a degree
as expected owing to the sharp dip in earnings over this time, though the interest rate and tax
rate determining P ∗E is relatively constant. As a result, we take the mean value of m = 0.7
though note a more refined analysis would consider the variability in natural growth rate as
well as the varying values of m through time. We next plot the values of γ over this period in
Figure 4.4b where we see the average value is 0.007 (1 s.f.). Based on these values we plot the
values of the S&P 500 quarterly earnings with the compounded earnings enhancements from
share buybacks overlayed in Figure 4.5. We see that over the last 16 years while the earnings
per share accounting for buybacks increased by approximately 364%, the natural growth rate
of the S&P 500 was closer to 287%, suggesting that approximately 30% of the growth (1- 187264 )
over this period is as a result of share repurchases of its constituents.
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5 Conclusion
The preceding work provides a quantitative analysis on the mechanical effect of share repurchases
on earnings per share. When shares are repurchased for a price below their critical price, the
increase in earnings per share can be estimated from a simple cash flow argument. When shares
are repurchased as part of a buyback program we are able to estimate the growth in earnings
per share that follows as a consequence of the program under both a geometric and arithmetic
model for natural earnings growth. We applied the methodology to the US market, analysing
the S&P 500 for which we see that buybacks account for around 30% of the earnings growth
over the last 16 years and over a quarter of the growth in the case of Apple over the last 5 years.
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Figure 4.5: Earnings per share in the presence, E′n, and absence, En, of buybacks for S&P 500
operating earnings per share (quarterly) for the given values of m, γ and i. We compare the
growth in earnings implied by the above analysis E′n (green) and contrast this with the natural
growth rate of En with ξ = 0.065 (red).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We consider the earnings at time T after a buyback at time t. If we assume that no event
affects the number of shares in the period between t and T we have that, Nt = NT and in the
case of a buyback N ′t = Nt − StPt . As such we have the earnings at time T given by
E′T =
α (OT + (Ct − St)iIt,T )
N ′t
=
α (OT + (Ct − St)iIt,T )
Nt − StPt
=
α
1− StPtNt
(
OT + CtiIt,T
Nt
− StiIt,T
Nt
)
=
1
1− γt
(
ET − Stiα
Nt
It,T
)
=
1
1− γt (ET −mtγtIt,TEt) (A.1)
and using the definition of the critical P/E ratio P ∗E(t) :=
P∗t
Et
= 1αi . Provided ET ≥ mtγtIt,TEt
(i.e. that mtγt ≤ 1 in the presence of low interest rates and accretive buybacks) we have that
E′T =
ET −mtIt,TEtγt
1− γt
= ET + (ET −mtIt,TEt)
∞∑
n=1
γnt
= ET + (ET −mtIt,TEt)γt +O(γ2t )
≥ ET + (ET −mtIt,TEt) γt
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where the remainder is positive by inspection. The series expansion can be derived through the
identity
a− bx
1− x = limM→∞(a− bx)
M∑
n=0
xn
= lim
M→∞
(a
M∑
n=0
xn − b
M+1∑
n=1
xn)
= lim
M→∞
(a+ (a− b)
M∑
n=0
xn − bxM+1)
= a+ (a− b)
∞∑
n=0
xn
for |x| ≤ 1.
A.2 Arithmetic earnings growth
In the following we consider the arithmetic growth rate E(t+ ∆t)− Et = ∆x. We model both
the natural earnings Et and the accumulated interest rate It,T as stochastic processes. For the
purposes of simplicity we consider buybacks occuring at regular times {0,∆t, 2∆t, 3∆t, ...} so
that we are able to consider only discrete time processes. Letting E[X] denote the expectation
of a random variable X we assume that Et follows some random walk with constant expected
mean, i.e. that
x¯ := E[E(t+ ∆t)− Et|Et]
is constant for all t. We additionally assume the expected interest rate over a single ∆t period
is approximately constant, i.e. E [I(t, t+ ∆t)] = (1 + ı)∆t , so from (A.1) we have that the
expected earnings after a buyback occuring at time t a unit of time ∆t later is
E [E′(t+ ∆t)] = E
[
E(t+ ∆t)−mtI(t, t+ ∆t)Et
1− γt
]
= E
[
E
[
∆x+ Et −mtI(t, t+ ∆t)Et
1− γt |{Et}
]]
= E
[
E
[
∆x
1− γt |{Et}
]
+ E
[
1−mtI(t, t+ ∆t)
1− γt |{Et}
]
Et
]
=
(
1−mt(1 + ı)∆t
1− γt
)
E [Et] +
x¯
1− γt
Such a result allows us to consider a sequence of buybacks occuring at regular intervals, every
∆t time increments. In particular we have that E [E′(t+ ∆t)] = aE [Et] + b for constants a and
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b that do not depend on earnings. Repeated application of this identity leads to
E [E(k∆t)] = akE0 + b
1− ak
1− a
=
(
1− (1 + ı)mγ
1− γ
)k
E0 +
x¯
1− γ
1−
(
1−(1+ı)mγ
1−γ
)k
1−
(
1−(1+ı)mγ
1−γ
)

making the simplifying assumption that γt = γ, i.e. the fraction spent on buybacks at any time
instance is approximately constant for all t. As a result we see that even when a company’s
expected growth rate is close to 0 in the absence of a repurchase program we have that
E [E(k∆t)] =
(
1− (1 + ı)mγ
1− γ
)k
E0
suggesting even under an arithmetic model for earnings growth, the affect on earnings of a
buyback program can not only appear to inflate expected earning but do so also at a geometric
rate. Furthermore, we see if in addition interest rates are low then
E [E(k∆t)] ≈
(
1−mγ
1− γ
)k
E0
which is precisely the kth power of the earnings enhancement occuring instantaneously at k = 0,
suggesting that in such a regime we may be able to approximate the earnings enhancement
through time by simply taking the power of the instantaneous earnings enhancement. Indeed,
it suggests even though a company’s earnings may not intrinsically be growing, if it is able to
buyback its shares cheaply it is able to appear to grow geometrically.
A.3 Stochastic earnings enhancement
We here introduce a simple model for uncertainty of the above where we make the simplifying
assumption that the earnings per share cannot be negative. In this case we are able to instead
treat i(t) ∈ R+ and x(t) ∈ R+ as discrete time stochastic processes defined on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P), with Ω = N × R+ and F the generated σ-algebra. We see in this case that
the earnings per share with and without a buyback are now stochastic processes. Following
the reasoning as before, we are able to construct the following process quantifying the relative
change between the earnings with and without a buyback as
G(t) :=
E′t
Et
=
1
1− γ
(
1−mγ i(t)
x(t)
)
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For the purposes of tractability, if we let i(t) =
∏t
p=1(1 + p) and x(t) =
∏t
p=1(1 + δp) where
1+p
i.i.d∼ lnN (µi, σ2i ) and 1+δp i.i.d∼ lnN (µx, σ2x) (we assume that both are independent of each
other) then we recover the following exact expressions for the mean of the increase in earnings
as
E [G(t)] =
1
1− γ
(
1−mγE
[
i(t)
x(t)
])
=
1
1− γ
(
1−mγE
[
t∏
p=1
1 + p
1 + δp
])
=
1
1− γ
(
1−mγ exp
(
t
(
µi − µx + σ
2
i + σ
2
x
2
)))
using standard properties of the lognormal distribution. Such a result suggests that as either
the interest rate or growth rate volatility increases the expected increase is dampened through
time. Finally, we see that the standard deviation of the process at time t is expressed as
σ(t) :=
√
V [G(t)] =
mγ
1− γ exp
(
µi − µx + σ
2
i + σ
2
x
4
)√
exp
(
σ2i + σ
2
x
2
)
− 1
where we see a monotone increase with γ (noting that γ ∈ [0, 1]), µi − µx, σ2i or σ2x .
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